The Language of National Security in NZ

A threat mentality stifles opportunity & independent thinking about our varied world ... when it comes to foreign policy.

This post is adapted from a talk given by Dan O’Brien at Diplosphere event: God Defend NZ - From What? On Nov 2nd, 2023. The title of the event was taken from a chapter Terence O’Brien’s book Presence of Mind (2009) on risk, security, and foreign policy. More material from this talk will be distributed shortly.

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New Zealand should consider carefully the consequences when adopting the language of hard power, of national security, as officialdom has done in recent publications by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT), and the Department of the Prime Minister & Cabinet (DPMC). These comments relate to foreign policy. In the interests of brevity, no explicit acknowledgment is given for the turns of phrase borrowed from former diplomat and thinker Terence O’Brien (the author’s father) – but safe to say, a quite a few have been used!

Global Shifts

First, to what global shifts does our policy need to adapt? A few recent perspectives … US National Security advisor Jake Sullivan described a new period of competition in an age of interdependence and transnational challenges. MFAT describes shifts from “rules to power”, “economics to security”, “efficiency to resilience” (MFAT’s 2023 Strategic Foreign Policy Assessment ). Others talk of the unipolar moment, lasting from 1990 – 2017, being now firmly in the rear-view mirror. Looking forward, the world’s five largest economies in 2050 are estimated to be: China, the United States, India, Indonesia, and Germany (Goldman Sachs, 2022). By this time, 2050, global temperatures are expected to rise by more than 1.5 degrees, and for our Pacific island neighbours, this is their overarching concern – climate change is a very real security concern (see the Boe Declaration). We also live at the dawn of the age of artificial general intelligence – where machine intelligence will equal or surpass our human own. It is on the horizon - an astounding advance.

Independent Foreign Policy

Turning to our foreign policy. Successive  governments over the years have laid claim to an independent NZ  foreign policy. The practical day-to-day truth in such a claim is difficult to identify. What defines independent foreign policy? Is it a pattern of behaviour, or does it depend on some captivating decision, or perhaps both. For many New Zealanders their country’s non-nuclear policy proclaimed by law in the 1980s represents a supreme example of the latter. It had and has international impact. It earned us and continues to earn us respect for independent FP. Interestingly, it gets only fleeting mentions in policy documents of officialdom.  

Rules-Based Order

And what of the rules-based order much spoken of? The world owes a considerable debt to the US for the enlightened effort and imagination devoted during the 20th century, to creating a global rules based order. It allows coalitions amongst like-minded to promote collective interests or for small nations to resist inconsiderate pressures from the powerful. Successive NZ governments have committed to ‘good global citizenship’. In an era now when the international pecking order is changing, it is logical that emerging leaders be entitled to equality in management of international institutions - like the UN, the IMF, the WTO, the World Bank - that provide bedrock for the international rules based system. That comprises the essential 21st century challenge.

The Language of National Security

So why the bone to pick about language? Well as it presently stands, recent government publications have little to say about this essential challenge which is patently in New Zealand’s self interest to take on. Indeed, New Zealand’s National Security Strategy (released Aug 2023), born in response to Christchurch terror tragedy and the Royal Commission of Enquiry, is all about protecting  New Zealand from threats. The remit is wide and includes twelve core national security issues like cyber, maritime security, terrorism, organised crime and other issues – which are clearly security related – but also an issue (at the top of the list), which crosses over into foreign policy, that is:  Strategic competition and the rules-based international system. Strategic competition comes up 30 times, and the term rules-based international order comes up 26 times - even more than in the MFAT Strategy document. It states for instance the rules-based system is under sustained pressure from several sources.

Evenhandedness

And in our region only one great power is being singled out as being Assertive – China – whilst ignoring other actions which could also be perceived as assertive, by others. The AUKUS agreement itself - a security agreement between the US, the UK, and Australia for the latter to acquire a fleet of up to eight nuclear-powered submarines at a cost of ~USD $300Bn+ over 30 years - or new military basing sites being good examples. Indeed, the past several decades, during the so-called unipolar moment, were “strategically benign” – to use document phrasing - for some regions (such as our own), but not for others: especially for those on the pointy end of concepts like the Global War on Terror. The Middle East suffered from much foreign intervention. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we see yet another region experiencing untold suffering. The latter region is called out by NZ officialdom, the former region is not. Only pointing out the exceptional behaviour of one great power is not really even-handed, and does not lend itself to a just view. Why does even-handedness even matter?

Evenhandedness in foreign policy  is important especially in  the new and  complex age of  modern  great power rivalry, as the US and China, adjust to China’s emergence.  Where necessary the insulation provided by soft power, for example, allows NZ , to draw  daylight  from  Five Eyes partners in relation to China when the national interest  is judged to be better served by a different approach. NZ interests identify clearly with the principle of equality of responsibilities and obligations between major powers as the basis for an inclusive international system. That is, a level playing field for small and big countries alike to abide to.

Drawing Daylight

Recently, in other regions, New Zealand has drawn daylight from Five Eyes partners. NZ being the only member to vote for a humanitarian resolution which passed calling for an immediate, durable, and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a cessation of hostilities in Gaza at the United Nations General Assembly last week; alongside some pacific partners like Indonesia, but, conspicuously not others such as Fiji. And in 2003, NZ and Canada declined to participate in the US-UK invasion of Iraq. In our region too, NZ should be open to acting with like-minded others, which may involve drawing distance from NZ’s traditional mainstays and keeping different company at different times on different issues. Now, rather than drawing daylight, the AUKUS agreement closes ranks. New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy notwithstanding, Kurt Campbell, the Whitehouse’s senior adviser on Asian Affairs, earlier this year stated there was an opportunity to collaborate on “cutting-edge technologies”. And this would be led by the White House. At times of intense great power rivalry  it should be no surprise that information shared by the great power member of an intelligence sharing arrangement, should reflect its compulsive priority. Today, that is a robust rivalry with China. In the past, it was Islamic terrorism. And that led to a gov’t blind-spot when it came to white supremacist terrorism, according to some in the NZ Muslim community. As the founder of the CIA, Allen Dulles said: “Intelligence is the servant not the master on foreign policy”. Have we learnt that lesson?

In sum, it is admirable that officialdom has its eyes wide open to the changing world and great power rivalry, with the bevy of recent publications. The importance of partnerships, and readiness to contribute especially in our Pacific region come through. To this end, a small professional defence force constitutes a real NZ national asset.

But given that soft power is NZ’s sole attribute when cultivating trust and opportunity diplomatically with old and new international partners, it seems counterintuitive to so weight NZ institutional arrangements - for the conduct of important external relations - along the lines of a national security state model. The defining characteristics of the national security state combine a staunch threat mentality with a firm conviction about the utility of hard power.  Balance of power thinking sits uneasily alongside the language of diplomacy, and the language of reconciliation. The Treaty of Waitangi places reconciliation at the centre of our democracy. And in the wake of an election, our newly elected members should take to heart the dictum: all foreign policy starts at home.